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ABSTRACT

This project interprets Aristotle’s Poetics through a morally educative
approach. More specifically, expanding on past research of Poetics by individuals
such as Isaiah Smithson, this project will examine the affective influence of
tragedy on morally unknowing audience members of vicious character types.
Through the associations between the sensory experiences incorporated in a
tragedy and moral messages portrayed in the plot, the vicious character can begin
a process of becoming morally knowing subjects. In others words, this experience
with morally charged tragedies can teach vicious characters what is morally good.
Moreover, the vicious audience members can learn how what is morally good
through the observation and interaction with surrounding audience members. By
experiencing the reactions of morally knowing subjects in the audience of the
tragedy, the vicious character can passively habituate actions of a higher moral
character. This project will also explore the ways in which the moral
reexamination of Poetics can aid in the understanding of the morally educative
power of contemporary artworks to illuminate the injustices of racism and
homophobia.
Keywords: Aristotle, Aesthetics, Vice, Moral Education, Contemporary Art
ii

Dedicated to my family, friends, and cats

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project would not have been able to be completed without the help of a
loving and supportive group of individuals. I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Audrey
Anton, for offering me a position as her research assistant and agreeing to co-author an
article that a portion of this project will eventually become. Moreover, I would like to
thank Dr. Anton for her unwavering support and encouragement in my time as her
student and advisee. I would also like to thank the members of my committee –Dr. Eric
Bain-Selbo and Dr. Dana Bradley– for their insight and enthusiasm during the
completion of this project.
I would like to thank the Honors college for their support in this endeavor. I
would also like to thank the Office of Research and Creative Activity for awarding Dr.
Anton and me a FUSE grant to aid in our research.
For their great help in the development of my ideas in this project and making me
believe in myself, I would like to thank Dr. Grayson Hunt and Shouta Brown. I would
like to show my deepest appreciation for Paula Williams, who always reminded me of
my strength. For their creative spirit and profound conversation, I would like to thank Dr.
Guy Jordan and Dr. Ingrid Cartwright. Lastly, I would like to thank my friends and
family for their kindness, patience, and love.

v

VITA

April 16, 1994 ···················································Born (Dasein Materializes)
Yokosuka, Japan
2012 ·······························································Smyrna High School, Smyrna,
Tennessee
2015 ·······························································Alain Locke Fellow
Philosophy in an Inclusive Key
Summer Institute at MIT

FIELDS OF STUDY
First Major Field: Philosophy
Second Major Field: Art History

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Abstract ······························································································ ii
Dedication
········································································································ iii
Acknowledgments ················································································· iv
Vita ··································································································· v
Sections:
1.

Introduction ················································································· 1

2.

Poetics Synopsis ··········································································· 6

3.

The Vicious Character ··································································· 11

4.

Smithson’s Argument ···································································· 14

5.

Moral Development Through Aesthetic Understanding ···························· 18

6.

Conclusion ·················································································24

7.

Further Research ········································································· 26

Bibliography ······················································································· 33

vi

SECTION ONE

INTRODUCTION
“The poet being an imitator just like the painter or other maker of likenesses, he must
necessarily in all instances represent things in one or other of three aspects, either as they
were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be.”
Aristotle, Poetics 1460b 7-11

Aristotle’s Poetics is largely interpreted as an aesthetic treatise that describes the
way in which a good tragedy ought to be constructed. This interpretation, though not
erroneous by any means, does not explore the ways in which Poetics could be connected
with Aristotle’s other treatises. Though Poetics has been often read in accompaniment
with Rhetoric, the aesthetic treatise can also be read along with Nicomachean Ethics.
When relating Poetics and the Ethics, the aesthetic treatise could be recognized as
possessing a moral quality. Moral interpretations of Poetics have been proposed in the
past. In “The Moral View of Aristotle’s Poetics,” Isaiah Smithson asserted that a moral
interpretation of Poetics can provide a cathartic experience for audience members to reevaluate their own moral actions.1 However, Smithson’s account of the educative nature
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Smithson, Isaiah. "The Moral View of Aristotle's Poetics." Journal of the History of Ideas 44,
no. 1 (1983): 3-17.

1

of Poetics does not target vicious individuals, for they do not have the ability to reevaluate their moral actions.
I expand on Smithson’s proposal that Poetics can be interpreted through a moral
lens by claiming that Poetics can be considered a morally educative tool for the vicious
moral character discussed in the Ethics. In other words, I argue that the individual of a
vicious character can come to know the good through the experiencing of tragedies –both
through the interaction with the performance and the interaction amongst audience
members viewing the tragedy. To do this, I first offer a short summary of the moments in
Poetics that support this claim. Then, I briefly describe the characteristics of the vicious
individual as spelled out in the Ethics. Finally, I argue the ways in which a vicious person
can learn to know the good and learn how to develop a better moral character by
examining the underlying moral relationship between Poetics and the Ethics.2
After the conclusion of the segment on Aristotle and Poetics, I have added a final
section in which I speak of the potential for further research by using this project as a
basis to explore the relationship between the audience and artwork in contemporary art.
Moreover, I am interested in using this project on the relationship between the vicious
audience and tragedy as a basis for understanding how contemporary artworks can have
an affective influence on the prejudiced individual who harbors feelings such as
homophobia, racism, and sexism towards marginalized individuals. Through the
exploration of this relationship, I hope to find effective methods of reshaping the ways in
which prejudiced people perceive marginalized individuals, and, ultimately, get rid of the
prejudices that they harbor towards others. Though I do not believe that the potential
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This paper is a portion of a larger work in progress that is estimated to be completed in Summer
2016 with Dr. Audrey Anton.
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morally educative aspect of contemporary artworks is the teleological function of art, I
believe that the acknowledgment of this kind of power that art possesses would aid in
future discourse of fields in philosophy that strive to establish theories of social justice.

3

SECTION TWO

POETICS SYNOPSIS
Aristotle’s Poetics largely discusses a formula that defines good poetry, i.e.
tragedies, comedies, and epics. In this work, I concentrate on the structure of tragedies,
which are defined by their ability to arouse feelings of pity and fear in the viewer (1449a
24-26).3 Since the focus of this paper is to examine how viewing tragedies affect the
moral character of the vicious person, I first discuss the elements of tragedy which
directly influence the affections of the viewer.
The element of imitation, which reflects events that could happen in reality, of a
tragedy possesses the power to directly influence the affections of the viewer. Aristotle
states that all poetry, tragedy, music, and art are modes of imitation (1447a 15-17).
Imitation is a natural means by which human beings learn, and we delight in doing so
(1448b 9-16). Thus, through imitation, mediums such as tragedy have both educative and
aesthetic value. Particularly, in tragedy, “the objects the imitator represents are actions,
with agents who are necessarily either good men or bad –the diversities of human
character being nearly always derivative from this primary distinction, since it is by
badness and excellence men differ in character” (1448a 1-4). In other words, the tragedy
is morally educative because the imitations in the performance reflect real moral actions
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The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, 935-1487. New York: Random
House, Inc, 2001.
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of good and bad characters. The strict illustration of good and bad moral characters in the
performance is a crucial point that the audience keeps in mind while viewing the tragedy;
this allows the viewers to understand with which characters they should identify and
strive to imitate from the tragedy. This understanding of which characters are morally
worthy to imitate will eventually relate to the affective influences of the entire tragedy on
the viewer.
There are six parts of tragedy that allow the tragedy to fulfill its function: plot,
character, diction, thought, spectacle, and melody (1448a 1-4). The most important part
of these six is plot, for it is the combination of all events in the work and is mandatory for
all other parts to exist (1450a 15). The plot is the imitation of the moral experiences and
actions that can happen in reality. As stated earlier, imitation is a means by which the
viewer can come to understand what is morally good or bad through the events that
unfold in a tragedy, and eventually relate to the affective influence of the tragedy on the
audience. In order for the plot to influence the audience members most effectively,
Aristotle defines the ways that the plot must be constructed. The plot must be complete in
order for the tragedy to be a good one. In other words, the plot cannot begin or end
without necessary events, just as “to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole
made up of parts, must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but
also be of a certain definite magnitude” (1450b 34-37). Plot is a “definite magnitude” as
an independent whole which is greater than the collection of each separate theatrical
moment, and the whole of the tragedy should have a duration which can make a lasting
impression on the memory of the viewer (1451a 5-6). Because of this, although the
character may seem like the most integral part of the tragedy because they are the
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elements of the tragedy with which the viewer identifies, the characters are vessels that
execute the actions necessary for the plot.
The affective influence of the plot on the audience is best established through
incorporating complex plot elements such as reversals of fortune, for they lead to
discovery in the viewer. Aristotle defines discovery here as “a change from ignorance to
knowledge, and thus to either love or hate, in the personages marked for good or evil
fortune” (1452a 30-31). Discovery is a means by which the viewer is able to insert
themselves into the plot line of the tragedy, for the moment of discovery elicits a
reflection of how the viewer’s own life is similar to the plot of the tragedy. The audience
member can experience discovery by reacting to the events unfolding in the plot, by
reacting to the ways that other audience members react to the plot, through the emotional
connection of an event that occurs on stage that is similar to an experience in their own
life, or through a reaction and connection to artistic cues in the tragedy such as the
reaction to a sorrowful melody incorporated in the tragedy. Through discovery, the
viewer is able to transform from a passive viewer, who simply observes the plotline, to an
active viewer, who is allowing the tragedy to intrude into their own moral understandings
and, in turn, placing themselves into the tragedy.
Aristotle states that “the tragic pleasure is that of pity and fear” (1453b 12-14) and
that the arousing of the moral affects of pity and fear is the end goal of all tragedies.
Furthermore, Aristotle describes the ways that a poet can construct a tragedy to
encourage the audience members to feel the emotions of pity and fear appropriately, for
the arousal of pity and fear is not morally worthwhile if they are not felt appropriately by
audience members. The feelings of pity and fear stem from the tragic deeds that are
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incorporated in the plot. These tragic deeds can occur in three different ways: 1)
knowingly and consciously, 2) in ignorance of the relationship with the person wronged
and discovered afterwards, and 3) meditated, but in ignorance of the relationship with the
person wronged, and have the opportunity to draw back and refrain from carrying
through with the meditated ill-doing (1454a 28-38). Concerning the appropriateness and
consistency of the plot, the denouement must occur directly as a result of the events of
the plot (1454a 37-38), and “there should be nothing improbable among the actual
incidents” (1454b 6-7). In other words, the incidents in the performance cannot occur due
to luck, for the audience members will need to be able to understand that the moral acts
are deserving of just consequences. These strict guidelines of how tragic deeds ought to
be portrayed in the tragedy influence the audience members to feel pity and fear
appropriately. Moreover, the arousal of the moral affects of pity and fear establishes the
connection between the artistic elements of the tragedy such as imitation, plot, and
discovery and the moral elements that will directly influence the affections of the
audience members.
The individual elements of a tragedy work together to create a whole that is
intended to influence the viewers in some moral fashion, which can be observed in the
tragedy’s goal of arousing the moral emotions of fear and pity. Because poetry, which
includes tragedy, focuses on the importance of a universal and idealistic plot, “poetry is
something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of
the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars” (1451b 5-7). The
distinction that Aristotle is trying to establish here is the ability of poetry to explain how
the world ought to be structured, while history merely gives an account of how things
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have already occurred. Although tragedies may include historic events and historic
characters, it is still able to portray the events through characters in a way that will sway
the emotions and cognition of viewers that simple historical facts cannot (1451b 25-26).
This privileging of poetry over the telling of historical facts may arise from the
inability of the telling of historical facts to create a cohesive story that affectively
influences the audience. For example, the telling of a set of historical facts will not be
able to portray the gravity of the historical events on the individuals who actually
experienced the event. On the other hand, poetry, and therefore tragedy, possesses the
ability to create a grander image of how the various historical events coalesced and
describes the moral outcomes of the set of historical events. The whole of the tragedy can
be utilized as a telling of how the world ought to be constructed, for the various triumphs
and downfalls incorporated in the plot will serve as a guideline of how the consequences
of moral actions ought to be handled in reality. The universal actions that are portrayed in
a tragedy is a stronger morally educative tool than the particular actions that are told
through historical events, for the universal actions portrayed in the tragedy can influence
all audience members affectively while the telling of historical events cannot. The
educative nature of historical events require that the audience member knows what is
morally good to learn from each particular event. On the other hand, the educative nature
of a universal plot in a tragedy is able to encompass the moral deed and its consequences
and is able to reach audience members that are not aware of what is morally good due to
its ability to arouse moral affections that occur despite the understanding of the good.
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SECTION THREE

THE VICIOUS CHARACTER

In chapter one, book VII of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes three types
of moral character that ought to be avoided – incontinence, vice, and brutishness (1145a
14-16). In the interest of my argument, I plan to focus specifically on the moral
development of the vicious character through the viewing of a tragedy, for the person
with an incontinent character that is already aware of what is morally good and the
brutish individual is a character that is not able to alter their moral character. In order to
speak of the way in which the viewing of tragedies affects the development of a vicious
individual’s moral character, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the vicious
moral character.
To understand vice, it is best to first understand how moral virtues are established.
Aristotle claims that moral virtue comes about as a result of habit (1103a 16-17). When
an individual makes a habit of a moral virtue for the sake of performing the moral virtue,
they will begin to develop a moral character that leans towards the virtuous. Once the
way to be good is evident to an individual through personal reflection or instruction from
a person of a virtuous moral character, one can begin adjusting the ways that they can
aim at the morally good through habituation. Since moral virtue is concerned with
pleasure and pain, and any moral character types can feel pleasure or pain, virtue is an
account of those who can act on pleasures that are nobler than others (1104b 8-10). The
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individual attempting to improve their moral character may feel pain at first when
committing virtuous acts, for they are not yet habituated to believe that the virtuous acts
are good in themselves. However, once one starts to perform virtuous acts for the sake of
performing virtuous acts, they will begin enjoying said acts and come to believe that they
are intrinsically good. The enjoyment of the acts that were once believed to be painful
before the habituation of virtuous acts occurred is self-rewarding, for the knowing that
committing acts of nobler pleasures will lead to the development of a higher moral
character that will feel more pleasure in pursuing nobler endeavors.
Acting on nobler pleasures and habituation of a higher moral character is a
consequence of choice, for all the development of all moral characters is concerned with
the choice to act virtuously or viciously (1107a 1-3). This choice to act virtuously is
difficult for any individual, for there are many ways to act badly but only one way to be
good (1106b 35). As Aristotle states, “it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and
likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant, then it
is in our power to be virtuous or vicious” (1113b 11-14). Since acting viciously is in the
power of the individual and is a choice, the vicious and unjust acts committed by
individuals are voluntary and done for a specific end in mind (1139a 31-35). The vicious
person, then, is choosing to act unvirtuously and creates a habit to act unvirtuously. Like
the self-rewarding acts that create the habit of being a virtuous individual, the acts that
establish the habit of the vicious person will eventually feel rewarding to act in base
pleasures. Because vicious acts feel self-rewarding due to habit, the vicious person will
fall into a state that will make it very near impossible to not be vicious (114a 19-23). In
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summary, moral virtue comes about through the habituation of good acts, and they are
products of choice.
Even though the vicious character may seem near impossible to alter, there exists
some opportunities for the vicious character to develop a better moral character. In an
explanation that all individuals of all moral character types are in a constant state of
moral flux, Aristotle specifically quotes a poet that states that “change in all things is
sweet,” for the vicious character (1154b 28-30). By this Aristotle means that the vicious
character constantly shifts their interests and pursues many different pleasures. Since the
vicious person is frequently flitting amongst different pleasures, they may finally anchor
themselves to a pleasure –such as the viewing of a tragedy or engaging with music– that
promotes the development of a higher moral character. Despite the habituation that has
made it so comfortable for the vicious person to keep acting viciously, the vicious
individual still possesses the ability to choose to do better even if the better may not bring
them pleasure. Though Aristotle speaks of the sweetness that is the change of the vicious
moral character to a better moral character, he does not offer a method for the
enhancement and development of the vicious character.
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SECTION FOUR
SMITHSON’S ARGUMENT
In “The Moral View of Aristotle’s Poetics”, Smithson argues that the element of
plot gives rise to the moral interpretation of a tragedy.4 The plot, as explained earlier, is
the most crucial part of a tragedy. The plot depicts the action of the tragedy, and, as
Smithson highlights, action is what brings about flourishing and happiness in the
development and habituation of a moral character.5 He supports his claims by referring
back to the teleological nature of Aristotle’s theories that span across his work in many
different fields such as ethics, metaphysics, and poetics.6 Since the rest of Aristotle’s
works rely on some end goal towards the good, Smithson argues that the underlying
motivation of Poetics should be considered under a moral scope.
Smithson analyzes many aspects of Poetics such as the role of plot in a tragedy,
the arousal of pity and fear in the audience, and the moment of catharsis in the audience,
which all encourage the reader to consider a moral interpretation of the treatise. The
analysis of these aspects lead to Smithson’s grander goal –to prove that tragedies offer an
educative experience for the audience members. Smithson grapples with the conception
that the plot of the tragedy “imitates good actions and, thereby, measures and depicts the

4

Smithson p.5
Ibid., p.7
6 Ibid., p.6
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well-being of its protagonist.”7 This interpretation of the role of the protagonist, a
singular element that makes a greater whole in the entirety of the tragedy, is a tool for
audience members to learn how to analyze the moral characters of others, for tragedies
are an imitation of the actions that can actually occur in reality.8
Smithson claims that the ways that audience members can come to understand
how the events that unfold in front of them in a tragedy can affect their own lives is
through the emotions of pity and fear. This claim is supported through the “self-directed”
nature of the emotions of pity and fear. Smithson states, “when members of the audience
fear for and sympathize with the dramatic protagonist, they are able to do so only because
they envision the disaster before their eyes as befalling them.”9 The emotions of pity and
fear, which are so closely intertwined with the understanding of moral virtues, establish
the connection of Poetics to a moral interpretation that Smithson describes. Since the
determining characteristic of a tragedy is the ability to invoke the feelings of pity and fear
in the audience, Smithson states that “to examine pity and fear is to continue to examine
the moral element embedded in Aristotle’s conception of plot.”10 With this interpretation
through the constant observance of pity and fear, Smithson emphasizes the inevitable
morally educative experience in audience members even if they do not entirely follow the
plot of the tragedy, and, instead, focus on each moral deed performed by the characters.
Smithson’s moral interpretation of Poetics seems to work only with audience
members that understand what is morally good. This assumption shows through in
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9 Ibid., p.14
10 Ibid., p.9
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Smithson’s claims and statements such as the ability to feel pity and fear appropriately is
the mark of the good person and “the audience’s capacity to sympathize with fear for a
protagonist is dependent upon believing that the protagonist is neither bad, villainous, or
utterly vicious.”11 The capacity to feel sympathy, or feel appropriately, for the
misfortunes of the characters in the tragedy does not address the ways in which the
tragedy influences the affects of those who do not know how to identify what is morally
good. Although Smithson only addresses the morally knowing subjects in the audience,
these claims do not exclude the presence of vicious individuals in the audience of a
tragedy. However, these claims do exclude the ability of the vicious individuals to
undergo the morally educative experience of viewing a tragedy.
Vicious audience members will not be able to undergo this type of morally
educative experience because, to the vicious person, the villainous or vicious characters
in the tragedy may seem to be good, for the vicious person does not understand what is
morally good, both in their own lives and in the imitation of actions that can happen in
reality. Furthermore, the vicious audience member will not be able to feel pity and fear
appropriately, so they will not feel those emotions at the moments that are intended to
conjure moments of realization of the moral message of a tragedy. It would be erroneous,
however, to assume that the vicious audience member will not be engaging in the tragedy
and feeling some type of pity and fear. If, as stated by Aristotle in the Ethics, the vicious
person is changeable, then the effects that tragedies hold over the vicious person should
be of some morally educative import. In the next section, I will explore the ways that
tragedies can offer a morally educative experience for vicious audience members even if
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they are not knowing subjects of the morally good. Though Smithson does not address
the effect of the tragedy on vicious audience members, I will expand on his proposal of
the morally educative nature of Poetics, and more narrowly audience interaction with
tragedy, and argue that the engagement of a vicious person with a tragedy may be the
only way for the vicious to change and develop a higher moral character

15

SECTION FIVE

MORAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH AESTHETIC UNDERSTANDING

I will focus on the nature of the plot of a tragedy being an imitation of actions that
can happen in reality in order to support my claim that the viewing of a tragedy can be an
educative tool for vicious audience members. However, this one connection of the moral
and aesthetic aspects of Poetics does not suffice for those who do not know what is
morally good. Because of this, I will also focus on the interactions between audience
members that can teach the vicious individual to feel fear and pity appropriately. Lastly, I
will focus on moments in Poetics and in book VIII of Politics that discuss the
relationship between the understanding of aesthetic harmony and moral harmony through
the relationship between leisure and moral education. Through these points, I will show
that vicious audience members can benefit from the morally educative aspect of Poetics
even though they may not know what is morally good.
Recall that, as stated previously, imitation has an instructive function. The
imitation of which Aristotle speaks applies to both the imitation of actions executed or
not executed within the confines of the performance and the vicious individual’s
imitation of the reactions of morally knowledgeable audience members who react
correctly during the performance. Since action is the “end and purpose” of tragedy
(1450a 22), it would stand to reason that tragedies are an excellent tool for those who are
not virtuous or on the road to virtue to learn how to become virtuous and be able to
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experience the consequences of vicious actions without having to commit vicious acts
themselves. For Aristotle, any act is the start to habituation. Watching a realistic but
fictional world play out the consequences that make steps towards vice would offer a
beginning for the vicious audience members to break a habituation towards vice. The
viewing of tragedies is the only way for an individual to indirectly experience the
consequences of actions without having to live in the midst of the action in real time.
Aristotle communicates the methods in which an audience member of a tragedy
can learn of the events about to unfold in the performance through the discussion of the
modes of discovery. These modes of discovery are not only of aesthetic importance.
Although the modes of discovery that Aristotle describes allow the audience member to
appreciate the artistic elements of a tragedy, the modes of discovery are crucial in the
moral growth of the audience member. The morally knowing subject is already keen on
the morally educative aspects of a tragedy, but a vicious individual in the audience does
not have the capacity to develop an understanding of the moral message that may be
woven into the plot of the tragedy. Because of this, the vicious audience member must
rely on the modes of discovery within the tragedy itself and surrounding audience
members that are of higher moral character types and their reactions to their own modes
of discovery when experiencing the tragedy.
The concept of the interactive audience is crucial in completing the observation
that tragedies can be used as a morally educative tool for vicious individuals experiencing
the tragedy. When viewing a tragedy, the audience itself is a part of the viewing
experience. Because morally unknowing subjects will be in the presence of morally
knowing subjects, those who possess a vicious moral character can learn how to react to
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vicious deeds, and ultimately how they ought to act morally. This phenomenon can be
observed in modern day examples of spectators at a sporting event who are ignorant of
the rules of the sport. For example, an individual who is unaware of the significance of
certain plays in an American football game may learn when to cheer or groan accordingly
to a good or bad play by examining the ways that their fellow audience members are
reacting to the game. Though the unknowing spectator may not know exactly what is
happening in the game, they will know when and how it is appropriate to act when
rooting for their team. Like the unknowing sports spectator, the morally unknowing
subjects of the audience of a tragedy most likely will learn to stop cheering for the
vicious character in the tragedy if no other audience member is relishing in the acts of the
vicious character.
In chapter sixteen of Poetics, Aristotle describes the importance of the rapport
between the art, in this case tragedy, and the audience (1454b 19-1455a 21). He describes
the ways that the audience may react to certain scenes and moments on the stage, and
further highlights the reactions that are the best for discovering the moral message of the
tragedy. For example, there are reactions of association, in which the audience member
hears the sorrowful tune of the harp and is brought to tears because they are reminded of
some sorrowful event or are simply moved to tears because of the beautiful melancholic
melody. There exists another mode of discovery in which the audience member reacts to
the moral acts written explicitly by the poet. For example, the audience may react when
seeing a friend betray another friend. This mode of discovery, usually explicitly portrayed
by the poet allows the audience member is to discern the severity of the tragic act seen on
stage (1455a 4-12).
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The viewing of tragedies is the only solution for a vicious character to learn what
is truly good. Since there will always be a moral character that knows what is morally
good in the midst of the vicious characters, the vicious person will learn to react correctly
when they see a good moral act and/or a bad moral act in the tragedy. When the vicious
person delights in the actions of a vicious character in a tragedy, they may be perplexed,
and possibly even frustrated, when they see that character with whom they identify falls
to great misfortune, for Aristotle claims that the vicious character must befall misfortune
in a tragedy (1452b 30 -1453a 6). In addition to these feelings of confusion and
frustration, the vicious audience member may begin to fear the consequences of vicious
actions in the performance and the fate of the vicious character and make an effort not to
act in the same way in their own life for the fear of similar consequences.
The relationship between artistic elements such as music and moral education can
also be observed in works such as Politics. When speaking of education in book VIII of
Politics, Aristotle claims that education should be equal regardless of moral character
(1337a 21-26). In educational programs, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of music
and learning how to spend leisure time well in order to continue to flourish even when an
individual is experiencing moments of rest (1337b 29-32). The knowledge of how to
spend leisure time well reflects a well balanced soul that knows when to act, work, and
rest. In the branches of education, the field of music instruction is the most connected to
moral excellence. The connection of music to moral excellence begins with the utility of
intellectual enjoyment through leisure (1338a 21-24). The allowance of leisure is
particularly important in the moral influence of music, since leisure, as Aristotle states, is
the first principle of action (1337b 32-34). The incorporation of music in educational
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systems, and the further enjoyment of music later in life, will be able to help an
individual experience a fine pleasure that comes from music even if they are indirectly
bringing about the pleasure as a listener. This passive experience of pleasure and
understanding of beauty is crucial in the idea of the habituation and development of a
moral character without actually acting themselves when watching a tragedy.
Since, as stated in the majority of chapter five of book eight in Politics, music is a
pleasure that is felt and enjoyed by individuals of all ages and character types, the vicious
person too will understand the aesthetic pleasantness in music. Music is considered to be
a noble pleasure for it is connected to the moral aspect of an individual. Aristotle states
that music inspires enthusiasm in the listener, and enthusiasm is “an emotion of the
ethical part of the soul” (1340a 10-14). This connection of the ability for music to inspire
emotions that are morally rooted in an individual provides the vicious person the
opportunity to learn what is morally good through the understanding of aesthetic
harmony and goodness. If the pleasure that stems from the experiencing of music elicits
emotions that are morally noble, then the vicious person can build off of the emotions to
indirectly learn what is morally good.
Since the experience of listening to music and enjoying aesthetic harmony will
not press the vicious individual to consider the connection between moral and aesthetic
harmony, I argue that the viewing of a tragedy is an eefective way that will pressure the
vicious individual to examine this relationship. In other words, the understanding of the
good of music and aesthetic harmony is not enough for the vicious person to learn what is
morally good. Though the vicious person will have an an understanding of what is
musically and aesthetically good, it only serves as a threshold for the vicious person to
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become a morally knowledgeable individual. Tragedy utilizes music in performance as an
aid in the telling of the plot, which, as Smithson states will always possess a moral
nature. Since the vicious person will not be able to identify the moral message or feel pity
and fear appropriately in their viewing of the tragedy, the vicious audience member will
have to rely on the discoveries that arise from the connections that they make when they
hear a sorrowful tune that accompanies the moments in a tragedy that strives to inspire
pity and fear in the viewers. This, along with the other affective influence of instances
such as the reactions of association to tragic deeds in the performance to their own lives
and interacting with other audience members are the only way that the vicious person can
learn what is morally good and passively learn how to habituate the actions that are
considered correctly vicious or virtuous. The artistic elements of a tragedy alone, such as
the music that aids the performance and plot, and the interaction with others that are
knowing subjects of the morally good will not suffice as morally educative tools as
isolated experiences. Only through the collaboration of all these elements in the form of a
tragic performance will they be effective as a morally educative tool for the vicious
audience members.
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SECTION SIX

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have argued that the morally educative nature of Poetics and the
viewing of a tragedy is the only method for the vicious individual to develop a better
moral character. This method is possible due to the understanding of what is aesthetically
good and in forms such as music that will always inspire emotions like enthusiasm that
are of moral import. Through the understanding of what is aesthetically good that is
morally significant, the vicious person can learn to associate the messages of moral
goodness in tragedies through the utilization of aesthetic components in a tragedy.
Furthermore, the vicious individual can learn how to feel pity and fear appropriately, and,
thereby learn to passively habituate moral excellences through their interactions with
subjects in the audience of a tragedy that know what is morally good. These two
experiences will always work in tandem in the unfolding of a good tragedy, for the
structure of how a tragedy ought to be is specifically defined in Poetics. The illustration
of how a good tragedy ought to be constructed should be considered as a reflection of
how the living of a good moral life ought to be. Like the poet of which Aristotle speaks
who portrays how the world ought to be through the tragedy (1460b 7-11), Aristotle helps
paint a portrait of how the vicious person can change for the better in Poetics. Especially
when taking together the moments in the Ethics and Politics that highlight the importance
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of the poet in understanding what is morally good, one can observe the importance of
Poetics in the moral education of those who do not know what is morally good.
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SECTION SEVEN

FURTHER RESEARCH

I pursued this project as a means to connect two of my interests in philosophy
during my undergraduate education: Aristotle and the relationship between aesthetics and
praxis. This project was half of a collaborative work with my advisor that will later be
submitted for publication after her half of the article is completed. In addition to the
publication of this essay as its own entity, I look forward to utilizing this project as a
means to speak of the relationship between art and the audience in contemporary art. Due
to my interests in philosophy’s role in social justice, I would like to see this project
address the power of art on the correction of racist prejudices in individuals who come in
contact with politically charged artworks.
Though there exists literature concerning the affective influence of art on the
audience, most of the existing literature on this topic does not explore the ways that art
can influence an individual ignorant of their own harmful beliefs such as racism and
homophobia. As I have discussed in this project, Aristotle’s aesthetic treatise allows for a
method to educate the vicious character of the good through the use of aesthetic elements
to relay a moral lesson. Though I do not agree wholeheartedly with Aristotle concerning
the existence of truly vicious individuals as his definition describes, I do believe that
prejudiced individuals are often unaware of the gravity of their racist comments,
thoughts, and actions. Despite the number of times that another person can inform the
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racist individual of their wrongdoings, the prejudiced individual may refuse to
acknowledge that they are, in fact, wrong, and may not even understand that their actions
could actually be bad. In this sense, like Aristotle’s vicious character, I believe that the
prejudiced person is ignorant of the good and will continue to act in ways influenced by
their prejudices.
Like this project that speaks of the ways that a tragedy can influence the morally
unknowing subjects, politically charged artworks such as Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s
“Untitled” (Portrait of Ross) created in 1991 holds an affective influence over the
prejudiced viewer. Cited throughout literature on the affective influence of artworks on
the viewer, Gonzalez-Torres’s works have been known to offer new perspectives on the
ways that a viewer can interact with an artwork. Gonzalez-Torres’s candy spill
installation has especially enticed viewers to break the wall in between viewer and
artwork by inviting the viewer to take a piece of the work for themselves, usually to be
consumed by the audience member. This intimate connection between the artwork and
the viewer creates a bond that fuses the two. This bond between the artwork and the
viewer allows for the introduction of a narrative that the viewer may not have noticed
otherwise.
“Untitled” (Portrait of Ross) serves as a monument of the love that GonzalezTorres shared with his partner, Ross Laycock, who died of AIDS. For the prejudiced
audience, this narrative may be ignored or criticized. However, when the audience is
unaware of the particular facts of the gender of the two lovers present in GonzalezTorres’s artworks, they may regard the bittersweet monument as a great declaration of
love. Before learning the fact of the relationship that Gonzalez-Torres had with Laycock,
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the audience members interacting with the candy spill may perceive the artwork as an
installation worthwhile of their attention and empathy. It is only after the illumination of
the particulars of the relationship that the viewer may harbor prejudiced responses to the
artwork. However, the story between the two lovers still holds as a loving experience in
the viewer.
Although the prejudiced audience may regard the artwork as unworthy of their
empathy after learning of the particulars of the relationship between two gay men
represented in “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross), the loving and empathetic moments before
prejudiced thoughts permeating the viewer’s experience can serve as an educative tool for
the prejudiced individual to correct their hateful beliefs. Like Aristotle’s vicious
character, the prejudiced viewer, who is unaware of the detrimental moral impact of their
bigotry may learn to view the individuals towards whom they harbor hateful feelings as
persons deserving of dignity. Because “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross) speaks in a language
that is intelligible to most audience members who understand the gravity of loving
another individual, the prejudiced viewer will be able to view the love between two men
as a relationship that is worthy of being meaningful. Like the vicious character learning
from the sensory cues available in a tragedy, the prejudiced viewer of “Untitled” Portrait
of Ross can step through the threshold of the sensory experiences that the installation
elicits in the viewer. The experience of claiming a piece of candy from Gonzalez-Torres’s
work and feeling a connection between the artist’s narrative to their own life is akin to the
experience of the vicious figure in the Aristotelean tragedy making moral connections
through the visual and auditory elements of the tragedy. Just as the Aristotelean vicious
individual may weep at the sorrowful tune of the harp during a moment of moral import
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in the tragedy, the prejudiced viewer of Gonzalez-Torres’s work can learn the moral and
political message of the artist’s narrative when they consume the candy and experience
the bitter-sweetness of the passing of a loved one represented by the dissolving of the
candy that they have claimed for themselves.
A similar type of experience can be applied to moments of correction of racial
prejudices through the interaction with an artwork. Such an example would be the
audience interaction with an artwork depicting the lived experiences of marginalized
individuals in the face of an oppressive system. In the photographic series Ain’t Jokin’
(1987-1988) by Carrie Mae Weems, the photographer captions black and white
photographs of black individuals with racially stereotyped comments and “jokes” that
illuminate the aggressions that black individuals face in their lives. Out of context of the
photographic series, the captions may be a source of humor for the prejudiced audience
member. However, in the context paired with each portrait of Weems’s black subjects,
the viewer’s gaze is returned by an unblinking individual. The gaze of the subjects in
Weems’s photographs do not break until the viewer turns away, and, even then, the
subjects of the photographs continue to gaze at the backs of the viewers with the captions
echoing throughout the viewer’s experience. When a familiar face of a person in fear
stares back at the viewer, the viewer, despite the racial prejudices they harbored towards
black individuals, will be able to understand the face of fear and the suffering that
follows. In this experience, the prejudiced viewer of Weems’s photographs may be able
to learn from the purely emotional experience of seeing another person’s pain to correct
their own prejudiced beliefs that they hold against black individuals.
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Similar to the ways that the Aristotelean vicious character can learn from the
surrounding audience members of a tragedy in order to passively habituate appropriate
response to the plot of the tragedy, the viewer of contemporary artworks can observe the
reactions of their fellow viewers to passively correct prejudiced thoughts towards the
subjects in an artwork. Moreover, the individual can learn of biases that they harbored
towards others when interacting with artworks and the viewers that are simultaneously
viewing the artwork. In both cases that the viewer interacts with “Untitled” (Portrait of
Ross) or Ain’t Jokin’, there will most likely be other viewers that surround the prejudiced
viewer, just as the Aristotelean vicious audience member will be surrounded by morally
knowing (e.g. incontinent, continent, and virtuous) subjects in the audience of a tragedy.
In the case of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross), viewers of the artwork will be
compelled to interact with the candy pile by taking a piece of candy to consume or keep
for themselves when they see other audience members interacting with the artwork. As
the audience members remove and consume the candy from the pile, they are
participating in the artists feeling of bittersweet loss of their lover. Though the prejudiced
audience member may not initially understand the intended message of the artwork, they
may learn from other audience members the meaningfulness of the artwork. GonzalezTorres’s installation not only depicts a moment in his own personal history, but a tragic
moment in history on a larger scale of the AIDS epidemic. The prejudiced viewer may
not have taken the lives lost due to AIDS as moments to be truly lamented due to
homophobic thoughts and beliefs. However, through the combination of sensory
experiences that “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross) elicits in the viewer along with the ways in
which other audience members react positively and respectfully towards the artwork, the
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prejudiced person may start their progress of ridding of their prejudiced beliefs towards
the artwork, and, hopefully, towards members of the queer community.
A similar account can be given for those who view Weems’s photographs in Ain’t
Jokin’. In addition to the affective influence of Weems’s photographs on the viewer, the
viewer can experience the morally educative aspect of viewing the photographs through
the observation of the ways in which others react with the photographs. Though the
photographs in Ain’t Jokin’ do not possess the same type of power to interact directly
with the audience as Gonzalez-Torres’s candy spill, the photographs still encourage an
interaction amongst audience members who gaze at the portraits and read the
accompanying messages in the captions. Whether this interaction between audience
members be direct discussion of the subject matter of Weems’s work or observations of
the ways in which people react to the artworks (e.g. shaking their head in disbelief,
glaring at other viewers who laugh at the “jokes” in the captions), the prejudiced viewer
may learn that others may reproach them for their racist attitudes to the subject matter
and question whether their prejudiced beliefs are morally correct.
Though I speak of the best case scenario in each of these interactions with
artworks representing political messages intended to be perceived by the viewers, I
understand that some prejudiced audience members may not react as positively to
artworks as I have described. Since the morally educative experience between the
artwork and the viewer relies mostly on the part of the viewer to discover the moral
message of an artwork, I understand that it may take an immensely long period of time
and multiple interactions with different artworks for the morally unknowing, prejudiced
audience member to begin the process of growing out of their prejudiced background.
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However, I believe that the morally educative experience between artwork and viewer is
a safe and loving way for the prejudiced viewer to face their own immoral beliefs and
practices. Since artworks are already valued by the individuals of a society, the viewers
will enter the interaction with an artwork in a respectful and interested state. I believe that
this attitude that individuals already possess towards the value and meaningfulness of
artworks can permeate the boundaries that exist between human subjects and reconfigure
the ways that people perceive one another. If an individual can improve their moral
character through the interaction with an artwork and reshape the way they view the
artwork into a loving manner, then the individual will be able to learn to perceive those
that they previously oppressed in a more loving and respectful manner.

30

BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, 935-1487. New York: Random
House, Inc, 2001.
Smithson, Isaiah. "The Moral View of Aristotle's Poetics." Journal of the History of Ideas
44, no. 1 (1983): 3-17

31

